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Abstract
This paper takes an axiomatic bargaining approach to bankruptcy problems with
nontransferable utility by characterizing bankruptcy rules in terms of properties from
bargaining theory. In particular, we derive new axiomatic characterizations of the
proportional rule, the truncated proportional rule, and the constrained relative equal
awards rule using properties which concern changes in the estate or the claims.
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1 Introduction
In a bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility, claimants have incompatible claims on
a deficient estate which corresponds to a set of utility allocations. Bankruptcy rules assign
to any such bankruptcy problem a feasible utility allocation, i.e. an allocation for which
the individual utility payoffs are bounded by the corresponding claims. On the one hand,
bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility generalize monetary bankruptcy problems
(cf. O’Neill 1982). On the other hand, they can be considered as an alternative interpretation
of bargaining problems with claims (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992).
Recently, Dietzenbacher, Este´vez-Ferna´ndez, Borm, and Hendrickx (2016) and Dietzen-
bacher, Borm, and Este´vez-Ferna´ndez (2017) took an axiomatic approach to bankruptcy
problems with nontransferable utility by characterizing bankruptcy rules in terms of ade-
quately generalized properties from bankruptcy theory. To explore the proportional rule, the
truncated proportional rule, and the constrained relative equal awards rule, they introduced
the relative symmetry axiom, which imposes a relatively equal treatment of relatively equal
claimants, and the truncation invariance axiom, which imposes invariance under truncation
of the claims by the estate.
Orshan, Valenciano, and Zarzuelo (2003), Este´vez-Ferna´ndez, Borm, and Fiestras-Janeiro
(2014) and Dietzenbacher (2018) took a game theoretic approach to bankruptcy problems
with nontransferable utility by defining an appropriate coalitional bankruptcy game and
focusing on the structure of the core. Besides, Dietzenbacher (2018) characterized the class
of game theoretic bankruptcy rules by the truncation invariance property.
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This paper takes an axiomatic bargaining approach to bankruptcy problems with non-
transferable utility by characterizing bankruptcy rules in terms of properties from bargaining
theory. Similar to Chun and Thomson (1992), we interpret the estate of a bankruptcy pro-
blem as the feasible set of a bargaining problem as introduced by Nash (1950) which is
enriched by a claims vector. However, we adopt the standard assumption from bankruptcy
theory that individual utility is normalized in such a way that allocating nothing corresponds
to a utility level of zero. Therefore, it is convenient to consider the zero vector as a natural
benchmark for allocations instead of an exogenous disagreement point as within bargaining
problems. Although not addressed in this paper, this does still allow for the approach of
Herrero (1997), which interprets the vector of minimal rights of a bankruptcy problem, the
maximal individual payoffs within the estate when all other claimants are allocated their
claims, as the corresponding endogenous disagreement point of a bargaining problem with
claims.
We consider the role of the claims vector within bankruptcy problems as being ‘dual’ to
the role of the disagreement point within bargaining problems. Where the disagreement point
serves as a lower bound for rational payoff allocations within a bargaining problem, the claims
vector serves as an upper bound for feasible payoff allocations within a bankruptcy problem.
Following the classical axiomatic theory of bargaining, we formulate several properties which
concern changes in the estate or the claims, where the latter ones are based on axioms
concerning changes in the disagreement point, and study their implications. In particular,
we translate several axioms from bargaining theory to the domain of bankruptcy problems
with nontransferable utility, study their relations, and combine them with the standard
axioms of relative symmetry and truncation invariance from bankruptcy theory to derive
new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule, the truncated proportional rule,
and the constrained relative equal awards rule.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of notions
for bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. In Section 3, we introduce and study
the implications of axioms concerning changes in the estate. In Section 4, we introduce and
study the implications of axioms concerning changes in the claims. Section 5 concludes and
formulates some suggestions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a nonempty and finite set of claimants. For any x, y ∈ RN+ , x ≤ y denotes xi ≤ yi
for all i ∈ N , and x < y denotes xi < yi for all i ∈ N . For any set of payoff allocations
E ⊆ RN+ ,
– the comprehensive hull is given by comp(E) = {x ∈ RN+ | ∃y∈E : y ≥ x};
– the weak upper contour set is given by WUC(E) = {x ∈ RN+ | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};
– the weak Pareto set is given by WP(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};
– the strong Pareto set is given by SP(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E,y 6=x : y ≥ x}.
Note that SP(E) ⊆ WP(E) ⊆ WUC(E). A set of payoff allocations E ⊆ RN+ is called
comprehensive if E = comp(E), and nonleveled if SP(E) = WP(E).
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A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility (cf. Orshan et al. 2003) is a triple
(N,E, c) in which E ⊆ RN+ is a nonempty, closed, bounded, comprehensive, and nonleveled
estate for which E 6= {0N}, and c ∈ WUC(E) is a vector of claims. Let BRN denote the
class of all bankruptcy problems with claimant set N . For convenience, an NTU-bankruptcy
problem is denoted by (E, c) ∈ BRN . Note that 0N ∈ E and WUC(E) is closed for all (E, c) ∈
BRN . Moreover, both (E∪E′, c) ∈ BRN and (E∩E′, c) ∈ BRN for all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN .
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . The set of positive claimants is given by
N c+ = {i ∈ N | ci > 0}.
The truncated estate Eˆc ⊆ RN+ is given by
Eˆc = {x ∈ E | x ≤ c}.
The vector of utopia values uE ∈ RN++ is given by
uE = (max{xi | x ∈ E})i∈N .
The vector of truncated claims cˆE ∈ RN+ is given by
cˆE =
(
min{ci, uEi }
)
i∈N .
Note that N c+ 6= ∅, uEˆc = cˆE , and Eˆc = EˆcˆE .
Example 1
Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN given by E = {x ∈ RN+ |
x21 + 12x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 4). Then N c+ = {1, 2}, Eˆc = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 12x2 ≤ 36, x1 ≤ 3},
uE = (6, 3), and cˆE = (3, 3).
Eˆc
uE
c
cˆE
x10 1 2 3 4 5 6
x2
1
2
3
4
A bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff allocation
f(E, c) ∈WP(E) for which f(E, c) ≤ c. A bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ satisfies
– relative symmetry if fi(E,c)
uEi
=
fj(E,c)
uEj
for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any i, j ∈ N for which
ci
uEi
=
cj
uEj
;
– truncation invariance if f(E, c) = f(E, cˆE) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
The properties relative symmetry and truncation invariance are standard within bankruptcy
theory. The use of utopia values is also standard within bargaining theory since the seminal
work of Raiffa (1953) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975).
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The proportional rule Prop : BRN → RN+ (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. 2016) assigns to any
(E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
Prop(E, c) = λE,cc,
where λE,c = max{t ∈ (0, 1] | tc ∈ E}. The proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry,
but does not satisfy truncation invariance.
The truncated proportional rule TProp : BRN → RN+ (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. 2017)
assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
TProp(E, c) = Prop(E, cˆE).
The truncated proportional rule satisfies both relative symmetry and truncation invariance.
The constrained relative equal awards rule CREA : BRN → RN+ (cf. Dietzenbacher et al.
2016) assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
CREA(E, c) =
(
min{ci, αE,cuEi }
)
i∈N ,
where αE,c = max{t ∈ (0, 1] | (min{ci, tuEi })i∈N ∈ E}. The constrained relative equal
awards rule satisfies both relative symmetry and truncation invariance.
Example 2
Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN given by E = {x ∈
RN+ | x21 + 12x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 4) as in Example 1. Then Prop(E, c) = (2, 2 23 ) ( ),
TProp(E, c) = (6
√
2− 6, 6√2− 6) ( ), and CREA(E, c) = (3, 2 14 ) ( ).
E
uE
c
cˆE
x10 1 2 3 4 5 6
x2
1
2
3
αE,cuE
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3 Modifying the Estate
In this section, we introduce and study the implications of axioms concerning changes in the
estate. Starting from the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom intro-
duced by Nash (1950), several axioms concerning changes in the feasible set of bargaining
problems have been proposed in the literature. Kalai (1977) introduced a strong monotoni-
city axiom and the axiom of step-by-step negotiations, which were further studied by Roth
(1979). Thomson and Myerson (1980) introduced the axioms domination and independence
of undominating alternatives. Peters (2010) introduced the independence of nonindividually
rational outcomes axiom to describe solutions for bargaining problems which only depend
on the rational payoff allocations within the feasible set.
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As exploited by Roth (1977) for the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, in the
formulation of these properties the disagreement point is required to be fixed. We translate
these properties to the domain of bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility in such a
way that the vector of claims is required to be fixed. The translated axiom of Peters (2010)
is used to describe bankruptcy rules which only depend on the feasible payoff allocations
within the estate. Following Chun and Thomson (1992), this axiom is called independence
of unclaimed alternatives.
Definition 3.1 (Estate Axioms)
A bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ satisfies
– step-by-step negotiations if f(E, c) = f(E′, c) + f((E − {f(E′, c)})+, c− f(E′, c))1 for
all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN for which E′ ⊆ E;
– estate monotonicity if f(E, c) ≥ f(E′, c) for all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN for which E′ ⊆ E;
– domination if f(E, c) ≤ f(E′, c) or f(E, c) ≥ f(E′, c) for all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN ;
– independence of irrelevant alternatives if f(E, c) = f(E′, c) for all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN
for which E′ ⊆ E and f(E, c) ∈WP(E′);
– independence of undominating alternatives if f(E, c) = f(E′, c) for all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈
BRN for which E′ ⊆ E and f(E′, c) ∈WP(E);
– independence of unclaimed alternatives if f(E, c) = f(E′, c) for all (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN
for which Eˆc = Eˆ
′
c.
Note that the proportional rule satisfies all these properties. The following lemma studies
the relations between the estate axioms. Some of these relations bear some similarities with
the results of Thomson and Myerson (1980). The proof is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 3.1
Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule.
(i) If f satisfies step-by-step negotiations, then f satisfies estate monotonicity.
(ii) If f satisfies estate monotonicity, then f satisfies domination.
(iii) If f satisfies domination, then f satisfies estate monotonicity.
(iv) If f satisfies estate monotonicity, then f satisfies independence of irrelevant alternati-
ves.
(v) If f satisfies estate monotonicity, then f satisfies independence of undominating alter-
natives.
(vi) If f satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, then f satisfies independence of
unclaimed alternatives.
(vii) If f satisfies independence of undominating alternatives, then f satisfies independence
of unclaimed alternatives.
1Here, (E − {f(E′, c)})+ = {x ∈ RN+ | x + f(E′, c) ∈ E}.
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Lemma 3.1 can be summarized by the following diagram.
step-by-step negotiations
estate monotonicity domination
independence of irrelevant alternatives independence of undominating alternatives
independence of unclaimed alternatives
The bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff
allocation
f(E, c) =
{
(cˆEi+ ,max{x | (cˆEi+ , x) ∈ E}) if N = {1, 2};
Prop(E, c) otherwise,
where i+ = max{argmaxi∈N{cˆEi }}, satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, but does
not satisfy independence of undominating alternatives.
The bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff
allocation
f(E, c) =
{
(cˆEi− ,max{x | (cˆEi− , x) ∈ E}) if N = {1, 2};
Prop(E, c) otherwise,
where i− = min{argmini∈N{cˆEi }}, satisfies independence of undominating alternatives, but
does not satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives.
This means that the properties independence of irrelevant alternatives and independence
of undominating alternatives are independent. However, if relative symmetry is required in
addition, then the two properties become equivalent and are only satisfied by the proportional
rule.
Theorem 3.2
The proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. The proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry. By Lemma 3.1 and Lemma A.12,
or by direct inspection, the proportional rule satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Denote
t = max
i∈Nc+
{
uEi
ci
}
and ε = min
i∈Nc+
{Propi(E, c)} .
Define
E′ =
⋃
i∈Nc+
comp
(
conv
({(
tci, 0N\{i}
)} ∪ {(ε, 0N\{j}) ∣∣ j ∈ N})) ∪ E.
2Throughout this paper, we refer to the appendix for the derivations of properties satisfied by specific
bankruptcy rules.
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uE
′
c
x10 ε tc1
x2
ε
f(E, c)
Then (E′, c) ∈ BRN and E ⊆ E′. Moreover, uE′Nc+ = tcNc+ and λE
′,c = λE,c. We have
ciu
E′
j = tcicj = cju
E′
i for all i, j ∈ N c+. Since f satisfies relative symmetry, this means
that f(E′, c) = λE
′,cc = λE,cc = Prop(E, c). Since f satisfies independence of irrelevant
alternatives, this implies that f(E, c) = f(E′, c) = Prop(E, c).
Theorem 3.3
The proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry and inde-
pendence of undominating alternatives.
Proof. The proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry. By Lemma 3.1 and Lemma A.1, or
by direct inspection, the proportional rule satisfies independence of undominating alternati-
ves. Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry and independence
of undominating alternatives. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Denote
t = min
i∈Nc+
{
uEi
ci
}
and ε =
{
mini∈N\Nc+
{
uEi
}
if N \N c+ 6= ∅;
0 if N \N c+ = ∅.
Define
E′ = comp
(
conv
({Prop(E, c)} ∪ {(tci, 0N\{i}) | i ∈ N c+} ∪ {(ε, 0N\{i}) | i ∈ N \N c+}))∩E.
uE
′
c
x10 tc1
x2
tc2
f(E, c)
Then (E′, c) ∈ BRN and E′ ⊆ E. Moreover, uE′Nc+ = tcNc+ and λE
′,c = λE,c. We have
ciu
E′
j = tcicj = cju
E′
i for all i, j ∈ N c+. Since f satisfies relative symmetry, this means that
f(E′, c) = λE
′,cc = λE,cc = Prop(E, c). Since f satisfies independence of undominating
alternatives, this implies that f(E, c) = f(E′, c) = Prop(E, c).
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To show that relative symmetry is independent of any estate axiom, we introduce the
constrained equal awards rule. The constrained equal awards rule CEA : BRN → RN+ assigns
to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
CEA(E, c) = (min{ci, a})i∈N ,
where a ∈ R+ is such that CEA(E, c) ∈WP(E).
Where the constrained relative equal awards rule aims to allocate payoffs relatively equal
among the claimants, the constrained equal awards rule aims to allocate payoffs absolutely
equal among the claimants. The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies relative
symmetry, but does not satisfy independence of unclaimed alternatives. The constrained
equal awards rule satisfies step-by-step negotiations, but does not satisfy relative symmetry.
Prop CREA CEA
relative symmetry X X
step-by-step negotiations X X
estate monotonicity X X
domination X X
independence of irrelevant alternatives X X
independence of undominating alternatives X X
independence of unclaimed alternatives X X
This means that relative symmetry is independent of any estate axiom. This implies that
the properties in an axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule remain independent
if independence of irrelevant alternatives in Theorem 3.2 or independence of undominating
alternatives in Theorem 3.3 is strengthened to domination, estate monotonicity, or step-by-
step negotiations.
The proportional rule is not the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry and
independence of unclaimed alternatives, since the truncated proportional rule also satisfies
these two properties. Nevertheless, we can formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4
Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule. If f satisfies relative symmetry and independence
of unclaimed alternatives, then f(E, c) = Prop(E, c) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN for which c < uE.
Proof. Assume that f satisfies relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternati-
ves. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN be such that c < uE . Then |N c+| ≥ 2. Let
t = max
i∈Nc+
{
uEi
ci
}
and ε = min
i,j∈Nc+
{
xi | (xi, cj , 0N\{i,j}) ∈WP(E)
}
.
Define
E′ =
⋃
i∈Nc+
comp
(
conv
({(
tci, 0N\{i}
)} ∪ {(ε, 0N\{j}) ∣∣ j ∈ N})) ∪ E.
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uE
′
c
x10 ε
x2
ε f(E, c)
Then (E′, c) ∈ BRN and Eˆc = Eˆ′c. Moreover, uE
′
Nc+
= tcNc+ and λ
E′,c = λE,c. We have
ciu
E′
j = tcicj = cju
E′
i for all i, j ∈ N c+. Since f satisfies relative symmetry, this means
that f(E′, c) = λE
′,cc = λE,cc = Prop(E, c). Since f satisfies independence of unclaimed
alternatives, this implies that f(E, c) = f(E′, c) = Prop(E, c).
If we combine independence of unclaimed alternatives with the standard bankruptcy
axioms relative symmetry and truncation invariance, and the weak technical requirement
claims continuity, we derive an axiomatic characterization of the truncated proportional rule
by using Lemma 3.4.
Definition 3.2 (Claims Continuity)
A bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ satisfies claims continuity if f(E, c) is continuous in c for
all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
Theorem 3.5
The truncated proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry,
truncation invariance, independence of unclaimed alternatives, and claims continuity.
Proof. The truncated proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry and truncation invariance.
By Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3, the truncated proportional rule satisfies independence of
unclaimed alternatives and claims continuity. Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule
satisfying relative symmetry, truncation invariance, independence of unclaimed alternatives,
and claims continuity. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . If |N c+| = 1, then f(E, c) = (uENc+ , 0N\Nc+) =
TProp(E, c). Suppose that |N c+| ≥ 2. Let {xk}k∈N be a sequence in WUC(E) defined by
xk =
1
kProp(E, cˆ
E) + (1− 1k )cˆE for all k ∈ N. Then xk < uE for all k ∈ N and limk→∞ xk =
cˆE . Since f satisfies relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternatives, Lemma
3.4 implies that f(E, xk) = Prop(E, xk) = Prop(E, cˆ
E) = TProp(E, c) for all k ∈ N. Since
f satisfies claims continuity, this means that f(E, cˆE) = limk→∞ f(E, xk) = TProp(E, c).
Since f satisfies truncation invariance, this implies that f(E, c) = f(E, cˆE) = TProp(E, c).
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To show that the properties in Theorem 3.5 are independent, we introduce the restricted
truncated proportional rule. The restricted truncated proportional rule RTProp : BRN →
RN+ assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
RTProp(E, c) =
{
Prop(E, c) if c < uE ;
(tuES , 0N\S) otherwise,
where S = {i ∈ N | ci ≥ uEi } and t ∈ (0, 1] is such that RTProp(E, c) ∈WP(E).
The restricted truncated proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry, truncation inva-
riance, and independence of unclaimed alternatives, but does not satisfy claims continuity.
The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies relative symmetry, truncation invariance,
and claims continuity, but does not satisfy independence of unclaimed alternatives. The pro-
portional rule satisfies relative symmetry, independence of unclaimed alternatives, and claims
continuity, but does not satisfy truncation invariance. The constrained equal awards rule sa-
tisfies truncation invariance, independence of unclaimed alternatives, and claims continuity,
but does not satisfy relative symmetry.
TProp RTProp CREA Prop CEA
relative symmetry X X X X
truncation invariance X X X X
independence of unclaimed alternatives X X X X
claims continuity X X X X
This means that the properties in Theorem 3.5 are independent.
4 Shifting the Claims
In this section, we introduce and study the implications of axioms concerning changes in
the claims. Several axioms concerning changes in the disagreement point of bargaining
problems have been proposed in the literature. We translate these properties to the domain
of bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility in such a way that they concern similar
changes in the vector of claims while the estate is required to be fixed.
Livne (1988) and Chun and Thomson (1990) use a convexity axiom which imposes that
convex combinations of disagreement points with equal outcomes lead to the same outcome.
Peters and Van Damme (1991) and Peters (2010) use related axioms which impose that
convex or linear combinations of a disagreement point and its corresponding outcome lead
to the same outcome. We translate these properties, introduce an even stronger linearity
axiom, and study their relations.
Definition 4.1 (Claims Axioms)
A bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ satisfies
– claims linearity if f(E, c) = f(E, θc+ (1− θ)c′) for all (E, c), (E, c′) ∈ BRN for which
f(E, c) = f(E, c′) and any θ ∈ R for which (E, θc+ (1− θ)c′) ∈ BRN ;
– weak claims linearity if f(E, c) = f(E, θc + (1 − θ)f(E, c)) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and
any θ ∈ R+;
– claims convexity if f(E, c) = f(E, θc+ (1− θ)c′) for all (E, c), (E, c′) ∈ BRN for which
f(E, c) = f(E, c′) and any θ ∈ [0, 1];
– weak claims convexity if f(E, c) = f(E, θc + (1 − θ)f(E, c)) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and
any θ ∈ [0, 1].
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Note that the proportional rule satisfies all these properties. The following lemma pre-
sents the relations between the claims axioms.
Lemma 4.1
Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule.
(i) If f satisfies claims linearity, then f satisfies weak claims linearity.
(ii) If f satisfies claims linearity, then f satisfies claims convexity.
(iii) If f satisfies weak claims linearity, then f satisfies weak claims convexity.
(iv) If f satisfies claims convexity, then f satisfies weak claims convexity.
Lemma 4.1 can be summarized by the following diagram.
claims linearity weak claims linearity
claims convexity weak claims convexity
The bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff
allocation
f(E, c) =
{
(cˆE1 ,min{c2, tuE2 },min{c3, tuE3 }) if N = {1, 2, 3} and c2uE3 = c3uE2 ;
CREA(E, c) otherwise,
where t ∈ [0, 1] is such that f(E, c) ∈ WP(E), satisfies weak claims linearity, but does not
satisfy claims convexity.
The restricted constrained relative equal awards rule RCREA : BRN → RN+ , which assigns
to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
RCREA(E, c) =
{
CREA(E, c) if c < uE or c ≥ λE,uEuE ;
(tuES , 0N\S) otherwise,
where S = {i ∈ N | ci ≥ uEi } and t ∈ (0, 1] is such that RCREA(E, c) ∈ WP(E), satisfies
claims convexity, but does not satisfy weak claims linearity.
This means that the properties weak claims linearity and claims convexity are indepen-
dent. If we combine these properties with the standard bankruptcy axioms relative symmetry
and truncation invariance, the constrained relative equal awards rule is the only bankruptcy
rule satisfying relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and weak claims linearity.
Theorem 4.2
The constrained relative equal awards rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative
symmetry, truncation invariance, and weak claims linearity.
Proof. The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies relative symmetry and truncation
invariance. By Lemma A.4, the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies weak claims
linearity. Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry, truncation
invariance, and weak claims linearity. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . If c ∈ E, then f(E, c) = c =
CREA(E, c). Suppose that c /∈ E and denote S = {i ∈ N | fi(E, c) < ci}. Then S 6= ∅.
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Let x ∈ RN+ with x = θc + (1 − θ)f(E, c) for some θ ∈ R+ be such that xS ≥ uES . Then
xˆES = (min{xi, uEi })i∈S = uES and xˆEi uEj = uEi uEj = xˆEj uEi for all i, j ∈ S. Since f satisfies
relative symmetry, this means that fS(E, xˆ
E) = tuES for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Since f satisfies
truncation invariance, this implies that fS(E, x) = fS(E, xˆ
E) = tuES . Since f satisfies weak
claims linearity, fS(E, c) = fS(E, x) = tu
E
S . Then fS(E, c) ≤ αE,cuES , since otherwise
f(E, c) ≥ CREA(E, c) and f(E, c) 6= CREA(E, c), which contradicts that E is nonleveled.
Suppose that there exists an i ∈ N \ S such that fi(E, c) > αE,cuEi . Then fj(E, c)uEi ≤
αE,cuEj u
E
i < fi(E, c)u
E
j for all j ∈ S. Let y ∈ RN+ be such that y = θc+(1−θ)f(E, c) for some
θ ∈ R++ and yjuEi = fi(E, c)uEj for some j ∈ S. Then yiuEj = fi(E, c)uEj = yjuEi . Since f
satisfies relative symmetry, this means that fi(E, y)u
E
j = fj(E, y)u
E
i . Since f satisfies weak
claims linearity, this implies that fi(E, c)u
E
j = fj(E, c)u
E
i . This is a contradiction. Hence,
fi(E, c) ≤ min{ci, αE,cuEi } = CREAi(E, c) for all i ∈ N . Since E is nonleveled, this implies
that f(E, c) = CREA(E, c).
The truncated proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry and truncation invariance,
but does not satisfy weak claims linearity. The proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry
and weak claims linearity, but does not satisfy truncation invariance. The constrained equal
awards rule satisfies truncation invariance and weak claims linearity, but does not satisfy
relative symmetry.
CREA TProp Prop CEA
relative symmetry X X X
truncation invariance X X X
weak claims linearity X X X
This means that the properties in Theorem 4.2 are independent. The constrained relative
equal awards rule is not the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry, truncation
invariance, and claims convexity, since the restricted constrained relative equal awards rule
also satisfies these three properties.
The axioms concerning changes in the claims can also be combined with the axioms
concerning changes in the estate. The proportional rule is not the unique bankruptcy rule
satisfying relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternatives, since the truncated
proportional rule also satisfies these two properties. However, if weak claims linearity is
required in addition, then these properties are only satisfied by the proportional rule.
Theorem 4.3
The proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry, indepen-
dence of unclaimed alternatives, and weak claims linearity.
Proof. The proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry. By Lemma 3.1, Lemma 4.1, Lemma
A.1, and Lemma A.5, the proportional rule satisfies independence of unclaimed alternatives
and weak claims linearity. Let f : BRN → RN+ be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative
symmetry, independence of unclaimed alternatives, and weak claims linearity. Let (E, c) ∈
BRN . If |N c+| = 1, then f(E, c) = (uENc+ , 0N\Nc+) = Prop(E, c). Suppose that |N c+| ≥ 2. Let
x ∈ RN+ with x = θc + (1 − θ)Prop(E, c) for some θ ∈ (0, 1] be such that x < uE . Since f
satisfies relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternatives, Lemma 3.4 implies
that f(E, x) = Prop(E, x) = Prop(E, c). Since f satisfies weak claims linearity, this implies
that f(E, c) = f(E, 1θx+ (1− 1θ )f(E, x)) = f(E, x) = Prop(E, c).
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To show that relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternatives are indepen-
dent of any claims axiom, we introduce two classes of bankruptcy rules. First, let Ψ denote
the class of all continuous functions ψ : R2++ → R++ for which
– limx1→0 ψ(x1, x2) =∞ for all x ∈ R2++;
– limx2→0 ψ(x1, x2) = 0 for all x ∈ R2++;
– ψ(x) ≥ ψ(y) for all x, y ∈ R2++ for which x1 < y1 and x2 > y2.
For any ψ ∈ Ψ and any (E, c) ∈ BRN for which N = N c+ = {1, 2} and c /∈ E, let ξ ∈WP(E)
be defined such that ψ(ξ) = c2−ξ2c1−ξ1 . Note that ξ exists and is uniquely defined.
For any ψ ∈ Ψ for which ψ( 12 , 12 ) = 1, the bankruptcy rule fψ1 : BRN → RN+ assigns to
any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
fψ1 (E, c) =
{
ξ if N = N c+ = {1, 2}, E = {x ∈ RN+ | x1 + x2 ≤ 1}, and c /∈ E;
Prop(E, c) otherwise.
Note that fψ1 = Prop if and only if ψ(x) =
x2
x1
for all x ∈ R2++.
For any ψ ∈ Ψ, the bankruptcy rule fψ2 : BRN → RN+ assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the
payoff allocation
fψ2 (E, c) =
{
ξ if N = N c+ = {1, 2} and c /∈ E;
Prop(E, c) otherwise.
Note that fψ2 = Prop if and only if ψ(x) =
x2
x1
for all x ∈ R2++.
The truncated proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry and independence of un-
claimed alternatives, but does not satisfy weak claims convexity. Any bankruptcy rule
fψ1 6= Prop satisfies relative symmetry and claims linearity, but does not satisfy indepen-
dence of unclaimed alternatives. Any bankruptcy rule fψ2 6= Prop satisfies independence of
unclaimed alternatives and claims linearity, but does not satisfy relative symmetry.
Prop TProp fψ1 6= Prop fψ2 6= Prop
relative symmetry X X X
independence of unclaimed alternatives X X X
claims linearity X X X
weak claims linearity X X X
claims convexity X X X
weak claims convexity X X X
This means that relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternatives are inde-
pendent of any claims axiom. In particular, the properties in Theorem 4.3 are independent.
Moreover, the properties in the axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule remain
independent if weak claims linearity in Theorem 4.3 is strengthened to claims linearity.
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The proportional rule is not the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry,
independence of unclaimed alternatives, and claims convexity. The restricted proportional
rule RProp : BRN → RN+ , which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
RProp(E, c) =
{
Prop(E, c) if c < uE ;
(tcS , 0N\S) otherwise,
where S = {i ∈ N | ∀j∈N : cjuEi ≤ ciuEj } and t ∈ (0, 1] is such that RProp(E, c) ∈
WP(E), also satisfies relative symmetry, independence of unclaimed alternatives, and claims
convexity. However, if positive claimants are required to get positive awards, then these
properties are only satisfied by the proportional rule.
Definition 4.2 (Positive Awards)
A bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN+ satisfies positive awards if fNc+(E, c) > 0Nc+ for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN .
Theorem 4.4
The proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry, indepen-
dence of unclaimed alternatives, weak claims convexity, and positive awards.
Proof. The proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry. By Lemma 3.1, Lemma 4.1, Lemma
A.1, Lemma A.5, and Lemma A.6, the proportional rule satisfies independence of un-
claimed alternatives, weak claims convexity, and positive awards. Let f : BRN → RN+
be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry, independence of unclaimed alternati-
ves, weak claims convexity, and positive awards. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . If |N c+| = 1, then
f(E, c) = (uENc+
, 0N\Nc+) = Prop(E, c). Suppose that |N c+| ≥ 2. Since f satisfies positive
awards, there exists an x ∈ RN+ with x = θc + (1 − θ)f(E, c) for some θ ∈ (0, 1] such that
x < uE . Since f satisfies relative symmetry and independence of unclaimed alternatives,
Lemma 3.4 implies that f(E, x) = Prop(E, x). Since f satisfies weak claims convexity, this
implies that f(E, c) = f(E, x) = Prop(E, x) = Prop(E, c).
The restricted proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry, independence of unclaimed
alternatives, and claims convexity, but does not satisfy positive awards. The truncated
proportional rule satisfies relative symmetry, independence of unclaimed alternatives, and
positive awards, but does not satisfy weak claims convexity. The constrained relative equal
awards rule satisfies relative symmetry, claims convexity, and positive awards, but does not
satisfy independence of unclaimed alternatives. The constrained equal awards rule satisfies
independence of unclaimed alternatives, claims convexity, and positive awards, but does not
satisfy relative symmetry.
Prop RProp TProp CREA CEA
relative symmetry X X X X
independence of unclaimed alternatives X X X X
claims convexity X X X X
weak claims convexity X X X X
positive awards X X X X
This means that the properties in Theorem 4.4 are independent. Moreover, the properties
in the axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule remain independent if weak claims
convexity in Theorem 4.4 is strengthened to claims convexity.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we derived new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule, the trun-
cated proportional rule, and the constrained relative equal awards rule for bankruptcy pro-
blems with nontransferable utility using axioms from bargaining theory. An overview of the
corresponding properties, including the standard bankruptcy axioms relative symmetry and
truncation invariance, the axioms concerning changes in the estate, the axioms concerning
changes in the claims, and the weak technical requirements claims continuity and positive
awards, is provided in the following table. The constrained equal awards rule is included for
illustrative purposes.
Prop TProp CREA CEA
relative symmetry X X X
truncation invariance X X X
step-by-step negotiations X X
estate monotonicity X X
domination X X
independence of irrelevant alternatives X X
independence of undominating alternatives X X
independence of unclaimed alternatives X X X
claims continuity X X X X
claims linearity X
weak claims linearity X X X
claims convexity X X X
weak claims convexity X X X
positive awards X X X X
Alternatively, one could also interpret solutions for bargaining problems as new rules
for bankruptcy problems, in line with the work of Dagan and Volij (1993) for bankruptcy
problems with transferable utility. Future research allows to formalize this reverse approach
in order to further connect bankruptcy problems with bargaining problems.
A bankruptcy rule based on the solution of Nash (1950) could maximize the product
of the utility payoffs of all positive claimants over the truncated estate. On the domain of
bankruptcy rules with convex estate, such a Nash bankruptcy rule bears some similarities
with the constrained equal awards rule, since it satisfies truncation invariance, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, and weak claims linearity, but does not satisfy relative symmetry.
The proportional rule for bankruptcy problems corresponds to a specific proportional
solution for bargaining problems as studied by Kalai (1977) and Roth (1979).
Where the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) let the utopia values of the rational
payoff allocations determine an outcome direction, the solution of Kalai and Rosenthal (1978)
let the utopia values of all payoff allocations within the feasible set determine an outcome
direction for bargaining problems. For bankruptcy problems, this translates to the utopia
values of the truncated estate and the utopia values of the estate, respectively. In this way,
the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) induces the truncated proportional rule and
the solution of Kalai and Rosenthal (1978), when explicitly bounded by the claims, induces
the constrained relative equal awards rule.
Other solutions for bargaining problems were introduced by Freimer and Yu (1976), which
would prescribe the feasible payoff allocation with minimal distance to the vector of claims
or the vector of utopia values in the context of bankruptcy problems. A similar solution is
also studied by Mariotti and Villar (2005).
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Appendix
Lemma 3.1
Proof. (i) Assume that f satisfies step-by-step negotiations. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN be
such that E′ ⊆ E. Then f(E, c) = f(E′, c) + f((E − {f(E′, c)})+, c − f(E′, c)) ≥ f(E′, c).
Hence, f satisfies estate monotonicity.
(ii) Assume that f satisfies estate monotonicity. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN . Suppose that
f(E, c) ∈ E′. Then f(E, c) ∈WP(E∩E′), f(E∩E′, c) ≤ f(E, c), and f(E∩E′, c) ≤ f(E′, c).
Since E is nonleveled, this implies that f(E, c) = f(E ∩ E′, c) ≤ f(E′, c).
Now suppose that f(E, c) /∈ E′. Since E is comprehensive, this means that f(E, c) ∈
WP(E ∪E′), f(E, c) ≤ f(E ∪E′, c), and f(E′, c) ≤ f(E ∪E′, c). Since E is nonleveled, this
implies that f(E, c) = f(E ∪ E′, c) ≥ f(E′, c). Hence, f satisfies domination.
(iii) Assume that f satisfies domination. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN be such that E′ ⊆ E.
Then f(E, c) ≤ f(E′, c) or f(E, c) ≥ f(E′, c). Since E is nonleveled, this implies that
f(E′, c) ≤ f(E, c). Hence, f satisfies estate monotonicity.
(iv) Assume that f satisfies estate monotonicity. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN be such that
E′ ⊆ E and f(E, c) ∈WP(E′). Then f(E, c) ≥ f(E′, c). Since E is nonleveled, this implies
that f(E, c) = f(E′, c). Hence, f satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives.
(v) Assume that f satisfies estate monotonicity. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN be such that
E′ ⊆ E and f(E′, c) ∈WP(E). Then f(E, c) ≥ f(E′, c). Since E is nonleveled, this implies
that f(E, c) = f(E′, c). Hence, f satisfies independence of undominating alternatives.
(vi) Assume that f satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈
BRN be such that Eˆc = Eˆ
′
c. Then f(E, c), f(E
′, c) ∈ WP(E ∩ E′). This implies that
f(E, c) = f(E ∩E′, c) = f(E′, c). Hence, f satisfies independence of unclaimed alternatives.
(vii) Assume that f satisfies independence of undominating alternatives. Let (E, c) ∈
BRN and (E′, c) ∈ BRN be such that Eˆc = Eˆ′c. Then f(E, c), f(E′, c) ∈WP(E ∪ E′). This
implies that f(E, c) = f(E ∪E′, c) = f(E′, c). Hence, f satisfies independence of unclaimed
alternatives.
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Lemma A.1
The proportional rule satisfies step-by-step negotiations.
Proof. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN be such that E′ ⊆ E. Then Prop(E, c) = λE,cc and
Prop(E′, c) + Prop((E − {Prop(E′, c)})+, c− Prop(E′, c))
= λE
′,cc+ Prop((E − {λE′,cc})+, c− λE′,cc)
= λE
′,cc+ λ(E−{λ
E′,cc})+,(1−λE′,c)c(1− λE′,c)c
=
(
λE
′,c + λ(E−{λ
E′,cc})+,(1−λE′,c)c(1− λE′,c)
)
c.
Moreover, Prop(E′, c) + Prop((E − {Prop(E′, c)})+, c − Prop(E′, c)) ∈ WP(E). Since E is
nonleveled, this implies that Prop(E′, c) + Prop((E − {Prop(E′, c)})+, c − Prop(E′, c)) =
Prop(E, c). Hence, the proportional rule satisfies step-by-step negotiations.
Lemma A.2
The truncated proportional rule satisfies independence of unclaimed alternatives.
Proof. Let (E, c), (E′, c) ∈ BRN be such that Eˆc = Eˆ′c. Then EˆcˆE = Eˆc = Eˆ′c = Eˆ′cˆE′ and
cˆE = uEˆc = uEˆ
′
c = cˆE
′
. By Lemma 3.1 and Lemma A.1, the proportional rule satisfies
independence of unclaimed alternatives. Then
TProp(E, c) = Prop(E, cˆE) = Prop(E′, cˆE
′
) = TProp(E′, c).
Hence, the truncated proportional rule satisfies independence of unclaimed alternatives.
Lemma A.3
The truncated proportional rule satisfies claims continuity.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then limx→c xˆE = cˆE , limx→c λE,xˆE = λE,cˆE , and
lim
x→cTProp(E, x) = limx→cProp(E, xˆ
E) = lim
x→cλ
E,xˆE xˆE = lim
x→cλ
E,xˆE lim
x→c xˆ
E
= λE,cˆ
E
cˆE = Prop(E, cˆE) = TProp(E, c).
Hence, the truncated proportional rule satisfies claims continuity.
Lemma A.4
The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies weak claims linearity.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let θ ∈ R+. Suppose that αE,θc+(1−θ)CREA(E,c) ≥ αE,c. For
all i ∈ N ,
CREAi(E, θc+ (1− θ)CREA(E, c))
= min{θci + (1− θ)CREAi(E, c), αE,θc+(1−θ)CREA(E,c)uEi }
= min{CREAi(E, c) + θ(ci − CREAi(E, c)), αE,θc+(1−θ)CREA(E,c)uEi }
≥ min{CREAi(E, c), αE,cuEi }
= CREAi(E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, this implies that CREA(E, c) = CREA(E, θc+ (1− θ)CREA(E, c)).
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Now, suppose that αE,θc+(1−θ)CREA(E,c) ≤ αE,c. For all i ∈ N ,
CREAi(E, θc+ (1− θ)CREA(E, c))
= min{θci + (1− θ)CREAi(E, c), αE,θc+(1−θ)CREA(E,c)uEi }
= min{CREAi(E, c) + θ(ci − CREAi(E, c)), αE,θc+(1−θ)CREA(E,c)uEi }
≤ min{CREAi(E, c) + θ(ci − CREAi(E, c)), αE,cuEi }
= CREAi(E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, this implies that CREA(E, c) = CREA(E, θc + (1 − θ)CREA(E, c)).
Hence, the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies weak claims linearity.
Lemma A.5
The proportional rule satisfies claims linearity.
Proof. Let (E, c), (E, c′) ∈ BRN be such that Prop(E, c) = Prop(E, c′), and let θ ∈ R be
such that (E, θc+ (1− θ)c′) ∈ BRN . Then λE,cc = λE,c′c′ and
Prop(E, θc+ (1− θ)c′) = λE,θc+(1−θ)c′(θc+ (1− θ)c′) = λE,θc+(1−θ)c′
(
θ + (1− θ) λ
E,c
λE,c′
)
c.
Since E is nonleveled, this implies that Prop(E, c) = Prop(E, θc + (1 − θ)c′). Hence, the
proportional rule satisfies claims linearity.
Lemma A.6
The proportional rule satisfies positive awards.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let i ∈ N c+. Then Propi(E, c) = λE,cci > 0. Hence, the
proportional rule satisfies positive awards.
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